Al-Qaeda-affiliated groups in Syria squabble over leadership

Al-Qaeda-affiliated groups in Syria squabble over leadership

2013-06-13 Analysis by Rajeh Saeed in London

Jabhat al-Nusra fighters battle regime forces in April on the outskirts of Aleppo, Syria. [Guillaume Briquet/AFP]

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The third year of the Syrian revolution is seeing continued attempts by many foreign entities to impose their extremist agendas, despite an outcry from citizens and secular opposition groups.

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Chief among these entities is al-Qaeda, which, and through its branch in Iraq, has been a considerable force on the ground to try and create an Islamist state.

Al-Qaeda's actions in Syria took a dramatic turn recently, following a public dispute between two groups that have been active on Syrian territory, namely Jabhat al-Nusra (JAN) and al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI).

Although the two groups share their loyalty to al-Qaeda, they at the same time seem embroiled in a dispute over the principal object of that loyalty. Is it to the main branch of al-Qaeda in Waziristan under the leadership of Ayman al-Zawahiri, or to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, leader of the al-Qaeda branch in Iraq, which spawned JAN, led by Abu Mohammed al-Joulani?

The dispute surfaced recently when al-Baghdadi announced that JAN had merged with the "Islamic State in Iraq" (ISI), the Iraqi branch of al-Qaeda, into one organisation under his leadership to be named the "Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant" (ISIL).

Immediately after news of the announcement broke, al-Joulani responded in an audio message, saying he was not consulted about the merger.

After acknowledging that he and his Syrian comrades who co-founded JAN had indeed fought within the AQI ranks and that they are grateful to al-Baghdadi for supporting them, al-Joulani pledged JAN's allegiance to al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri, not to his branch in Iraq.

Al-Joulani's pledge of allegiance to al-Zawahiri led to speculation that he believes JAN today is too big to merge with the branch that spawned it, and should in fact be on equal footing in its relationship with the parent organisation led by al-Zawahiri.

The public dispute between al-Baghdadi and al-Joulani stopped there, although it continued on extremist internet forums, where many al-Qaeda supporters questioned the timing and the motive of al-Baghdadi's announcement.

Meanwhile, in a letter posted on the Al-Jazeera website on Sunday (June 9th), al-Zawahiri himself said that JAN should continue to operate in Syria independently of al-Qaeda's branch in Iraq, and that it should do so directly under his leadership.

He also announced he is dissolving the JAN/al-Qaeda in Iraq merger announced in April by al-Baghdadi.

But it is not clear whether al-Baghdadi can back away from his project to build an "Islamic state" in Iraq and the Levant, as reports suggest that until recently he was set on proceeding with his plan to bring JAN into his group and under his leadership.

ISIL recently issued announcements indicating it has commenced activities inside Syria. A video it posted shows minors -- who call themselves "Ashbal al-Khilafa" (Children of the Caliphate) -- being given weapons training in eastern Syria. The young boys were shown swearing allegiance to al-Zawahiri and al-Baghdadi, ignoring al-Joulani altogether.

The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights also reported that men from ISIL's "Sharia Committee"executed a Syrian boy on charges of blasphemy in front of his parents and siblings on Sunday in Aleppo.

CAN AL-BAGHDADI BACK AWAY FROM HIS PROJECT?

Several media organisations have reported that al-Baghdadi has moved to Syria, along with some of his senior leadership. Reuters quoted several JAN sources who indicated al-Joulani is in hiding, and that several of his fighters have either joined al-Baghdadi or other factions.

According to shafaaq.com, a news site headquartered in Baghdad, al-Baghdadi is leading an effort to marginalise al-Joulani and take over military operations from JAN.

Al-Baghdadi's alleged move came despite statements by various other opposition factions, led by the Free Syrian Army (FSA) and political opposition committees, distancing themselves entirely from al-Qaeda's agenda in Syria.

Sources close to al-Baghdadi say that many fighters who left JAN to join ISIL do not wish to re-join JAN.

Around "90% of Arab and foreign fighters [currently fighting in Syria] joined ISIL," aljazeera.net reported Abu Osama al-Iraqi, who is closely connected to al-Qaeda's "Islamic State of Iraq", as saying. "It would be difficult for them to turn back."

Even if al-Baghdadi were to abide by al-Zawahiri's instructions, his public dispute with al-Joulani has once again highlighted the conflicts plaguing al-Qaeda branches, including those related to struggles over leadership.

Recently, signs of internal conflict surfaced within the branch of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), when the emir of the branch, Abu Musab Abdul Wadud, dismissed one his field commanders in the Sahel region of Africa, Mokhtar Belmokhtar.

Belmokhtar then announced a separate group called the "Signatories in Blood" brigade, and pledged his group's allegiance directly to al-Qaeda in Waziristan under al-Zawahiri's leadership.

It is still unclear how al-Zawahiri will resolve the problems within AQIM -- he has not yet made his position known.

It is also unclear whether his admonishment that al-Qaeda-linked groups in Iraq and Syria co-operate with each other and refrain from infighting will influence the way al-Baghdadi followers will deal with other armed factions in the areas where they operate.

REPEAT OF THE IRAQ EXPERIENCE

Al-Baghdadi's probable relocation to Syria, and his insistence on moving the al-Qaeda branch he leads on Iraqi territory to the Levant, must have no doubt raised fears among Syrians and the international community of a repeat of the Iraqi experience with al-Qaeda.

In Iraq, al-Qaeda gradually pressured various opposition groups to join it and follow its bloody policies, which almost thrust the country into a Sunni-Shia civil war.

As it became clear later, al-Qaeda's indiscriminate killing policies produced an entirely opposite effect, as it alienated tribal Sunni groups who formed Sahwa councils to fight al-Qaeda, and also led to bloody clashes between al-Qaeda and other jihadi factions.

Against this backdrop, it may be the case that later down the line, ISIL would fight other groups that do not agree with its plans for an Islamic State, including JAN if it insists on refusing to merge into ISIL and stands by its allegiance to al-Qaeda's leadership in Waziristan.

SYRIANS CONTINUE TO SUFFER THE CONSEQUENCES

Al-Baghdadi's move to Syria may have come not because of successes his group was able to achieve in Iraq, but rather because AQI views Syria as fertile ground conducive to rebuild their organisation.

Al-Qaeda's branch in Iraq achieved no military successes on the ground in Iraq to merit its "expansion" into Syria in the first place. With the exception of having carried out suicide bombings, indiscriminate killings and assassinations, it cannot claim to have accomplished anything against Iraqi security forces.

On the contrary, Iraqi forces have been able over the past few years to dismantle several of al-Qaeda's key cells in Iraq and expel the organisation from its main strongholds in the country.

Al-Baghdadi's use of the name "Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant" is also an apparent continuation of al-Qaeda's method to use names that do not point to it directly but rather have religious connotations it knows Muslims commonly accept, such as Islamic State or Ansar al-Sharia.

While the fate of ISIL remains unknown, al-Qaeda's intervention continues, and the Syrian regime continues its crackdown, aided by Iran and Hizbullah. As for the Syrian people, they continue to suffer the results of foreign actors intervening in their three-year effort to see democratic rule.

http://al-shorfa.com/en_GB/articles/meii/features/2013/06/13/feature-01